Boatnerd Discussion Forum

Guest is correct in that there was no standard of strength for the Fitz but incomplete on what they did. According th Raymond Ramsay, who was part of the design team, the did a STRAIGHT LINE EXTRAPOLATION of the existing data for 600 footers and I think that they considered some of the data for the 600 plus boats including the AAA boats. In the late 1960;s they pplaced stress sensors on the structure of the Ryerson. When they saw the data, it scared the hell out of them. They neveer expected to see the data that they were looking at.
I down loaded some information on how to up load a file in this site and will study it and try again for the letter from Capt. Rankin.

Shipwatcher News wrote:

Jerry at Duluth wrote:I hope that this works. I have attached a six page letter written by the fleet Captain, Capt. Rankin, in 1977, to David Van Brunt, who over saw the USS fleet. It certainly should add some information to the discussion.

It does not appear that the attachment came through

Agree - this would be an interesting read if you can get it attached...

I have never heard anything about that winch. I have heard stories of other ships where the deck winches & lines were used to help bind the deck back together after cracking had occurred as an emergency measure to try & stop her from breaking apart but I have no idea.

Maybe things were way worse than what McSorley let on over the radio to Captain Cooper & they were actually struggling more than we know to keep her afloat.

I've always wondered if they had either run for the nearest beach or slowed down to let the Anderson catch up & not push so hard, maybe the outcome would have been different, but with his course of action, the Captain *almost* had them there. Those darn rogue waves were the difference between making it to the bay or going down that night.

You have to remember that when the Edmund Fitzgerald was designed and built there was no strength standard for a vessel of her size. Instead, her strength standard was based on the 1921 strength calculations, which assumed a maximum wave length of 350-feet. The designers simply extrapolated the load-line calculations for a 600-foot vessel to 730 feet.

The change in the load-lines on the Great Lakes came about when the 730-foot vessels started sailing out to Port Cartier and other St. Lawrence river ports in the early 1960s, where longer wave lengths would be encountered.

The permissible stress in tons per square inch used in the 1921 stress calculations was assumed to vary as the one-third power of length. This assumption allows the occasional peak in low frequency wave stress, as well as the high frequency springing stress encountered by the 730 foot+ vessels.

We now know, based on wave buoy data from the Edward L. Ryerson in 1965-69, that it's possible, on occassion for a lake vessel to encounter a 700 foot long wave. That is a 100% increase in wave length than what was though possible in 1921.

- Brian

During one of the radio communications with the Anderson it is said McSorely was overhead giving an order to not allow anyone out on the deck. If not for some type of issue topside what would be the purpose of there obviously being some consideration of someone venturing out on the deck in those conditions? Was there anything reasonable that could have been done to fix the broken vents? Wasn't there a report that some of the cable was played out of a mooring winch that could have only been done manually? If that is true about the mooring winch does that not suggest that at least one person or more went out on the deck to perform some type of task at some point during the storm? What type of emergencies would facilitate such an action? As per McSorely's overheard comment about allowing no one out on the deck does not further suggest that whatever was attempted with the winch was not successful? That is taking for granted that anything done with the winch was performed before the overheard comment.
Unfortunately, there are many more questions than definitive answers on this subject.

Watched an episode of Mysteries of the Deep with Jeremy Wade and they talked about how that particular storm produced unusually long wave lengths. The suggestion was that with the bow and stern each supported by waves all the weight in her belly was unsupported and she simply broke in two. That would explain why no paint was ever found on the shoal. Would this not also slacken the tension and lay the fence rail down? Just offering another scenario to consider.

wlbblw wrote:One other factor that I think had a major roll in this was the re-certification of her load lines allowing for deeper loading. During the accident investigations there was anecdotal evidence from former crew members stating that the ship was just not the same after that change. They stated that she would not respond like she once did to wave action & boarding seas. The ship was said to wallow too long & the spring action of her hull that made her pop up from waves & shed water wasn't there anymore. Now, I have never sailed myself, but I have worked with modified equipment before from vehicles to industrial equipment & trains so I can speak from experience that when a machine is taken past original design parameters, sometimes they don't act right. They were made a certain way for a reason.

That is a very good point. I'm not certain of the actual increase drafts granted to the Fitzgerald as I thought they were done at two different occasions during the late 1960s and early 1970s. GLMI's Telescope publication did report that the Fitzgerald was granted a 6.25-inch increased load line during the summer of 1969. By riding that much lower a significantly larger volume of water would board the vessel in heavy seas. It also seems that the hull would work slightly differently given the fact that it was setting deeper in the water than its designers originally intended. Perhaps more importantly, the increased draft reduced the vessel's freeboard. I have no insight into ship design but I believe most engineering goals in guaranteeing structural integrity is to produce a design that can withstand 150% of its maximum rated load without failing. So if that's also true with the Fitzgerald design is it not possible that every inch added to its load line eroded this safety margin by at least a small degree? Did the increased load lines require any additional strengthening of the vessel's structure? As you said, when machines are taken beyond their design parameters they will act differently. Sometimes in unusual and unexpected ways.

One other factor that I think had a major roll in this was the re-certification of her load lines allowing for deeper loading. During the accident investigations there was anecdotal evidence from former crew members stating that the ship was just not the same after that change. They stated that she would not respond like she once did to wave action & boarding seas. The ship was said to wallow too long & the spring action of her hull that made her pop up from waves & shed water wasn't there anymore. Now, I have never sailed myself, but I have worked with modified equipment before from vehicles to industrial equipment & trains so I can speak from experience that when a machine is taken past original design parameters, sometimes they don't act right. They were made a certain way for a reason.

Jerry at Duluth wrote:I hope that this works. I have attached a six page letter written by the fleet Captain, Capt. Rankin, in 1977, to David Van Brunt, who over saw the USS fleet. It certainly should add some information to the discussion.

It does not appear that the attachment came through

https://www.dptv.org/2020/watch-live-th ... tigations/

The above link is for the updated special about the sinking that aired on Detroit Public Television, they go into great detail about the location of the Anderson, the Fitzgerald, the radar headings etc., even the location of the shoal, I would suggest everyone watch it again!

Ships can sustain damage without actually hitting anything just by the stress of the waves on the hull and the normal twisting/bending that occurs during heavy seas. My guess is the ship could of had hull damage, whether by hitting something, or not, in combination with water entering the cargo hold via the hatch covers, and that probably was enough to cause the loss. Either way if you watch the documentary and listen to the experts, and keep and open mind you will see what they were up against!

Guest wrote:Just 10 minutes, approximately, after the Fitz may have sailed over that 30 foot deep area the Fitz captain called the Anderson reporting a bad list a fence rail down and 2 vents missing. Coincidence? I doubt it! Definite signs she had cracked her Hull. And Cooper and Clark were there we were not.

The following chart was done by a poster who approximated the Fitz and Anderson trek lines with the Fitz traveling over Six Fathom Shoal. I believe this is likely what happened that fateful night.

I'm not trying to disagree with you, but although Cooper and Clark were obviously among the closest people to the Fitzgerald at this time they were definitely "not there" in the sense of being aboard or within sight of the doomed ship when it passed through this area How were these tracks you posted reconstructed? I doubt the Anderson maintained an accurate plot track of the Fitzgerald? Were there any other vessels that had the Fitzgerald on radar while it was apparently passing through the shoaling area? I recall it very difficult at the time (1976-76) for the investigators to reconstruct an accurate voyage track line for the ship. What information has become available in the past 45 years that has clarified that?

I do agree it is compelling the Fitzgerald did report its problems shortly after passing through that area. That does not mean, however, that it was not having problems prior to this and perhaps even unknown to the crew up to that time. Aside from the reports of fence rail being down (the notion that floating object such as a tree was responsible is questionable) it seems to me that the main impetus of the shoaling of Caribou Island theory is the radar observations made by the Anderson. Since these were obviously not recorded for playback due to technological limitations at the time, these plots cannot be examined to validate this claim. The assumption that the Fitzgerald passed too close to Caribou Island also circles back to why McSorely put his ship into that position as he apparently had fully functional navigational equipment until after passing the island. In the end, your belief may be exactly right on and my questions concerning the shoaling theory based solely on Captain Cooper's opinion could be totally wrong. By definition, a mystery conceals the true answers. My mind remains open to all possibilities.

The storm itself was stronger than is typically seen in the Fall on the lakes. It wasn't unusual per se, and it's the type of storm that comes every ten years or so. The storm of November 10, 1998 was comparable in terms of intensity.

The difference between 1975 and 1998, was that the later was better forecast, due to improvements in numerical weather models resolution, and that we now have assimilation of observations and satellite data into the models. With the Fitzgerald storm, meteorologists had to play "catch up" and adjust the forecast frequently as observations from both onshore and out on the lakes meant an upward adjustment to forecasted wind speeds and wave heights.

BTW, a few years ago, Garbear who was sailing onboard the Philip R. Clarke back in the 70s, took some photos of the vessels in Whitefish Bay on the afternoon of November 10, 1975. http://newsearch.boatnerd.com/viewtopic ... &start=450

Guest wrote:Just 10 minutes, approximately, after the Fitz may have sailed over that 30 foot deep area the Fitz captain called the Anderson reporting a bad list a fence rail down and 2 vents missing. Coincidence? I doubt it! Definite signs she had cracked her Hull. And Cooper and Clark were there we were not.

The following chart was done by a poster who approximated the Fitz and Anderson trek lines with the Fitz traveling over Six Fathom Shoal. I believe this is likely what happened that fateful night.

There is a thread here last year where one poster came up with multiple course lines showing they could have missed the "shoal". One can manipulate data into what they want to see. The area has been dove on a few times and no bottom paint was discovered and the chart was not as inaccurate as claimed. Farnquist said that the changes were a few acres in size and nowhere near the 3 miles as claimed.

Its incidents like this in which a data recorder would be of extreme value. I know that such devices were not in use on Great Lakes vessels back in 1975 but are they now in use on current ships? If not, should they not be required?

I hope that this works. I have attached a six page letter written by the fleet Captain, Capt. Rankin, in 1977, to David Van Brunt, who over saw the USS fleet. It certainly should add some information to the discussion.

Just 10 minutes, approximately, after the Fitz may have sailed over that 30 foot deep area the Fitz captain called the Anderson reporting a bad list a fence rail down and 2 vents missing. Coincidence? I doubt it! Definite signs she had cracked her Hull. And Cooper and Clark were there we were not.

The following chart was done by a poster who approximated the Fitz and Anderson trek lines with the Fitz traveling over Six Fathom Shoal. I believe this is likely what happened that fateful night.

I doubt that the Fitzgerald picked up more than a few miles per hour in addition to its surface speed when it went down. Even with the propeller still turning and the shifting of its cargo forward there would not have been enough distance between the surface of the water and the bottom for it to accelerate especially through a dense medium like water in which only its hull was designed to pass through with any efficiency. The topside of the vessel would have produced a significant amount of drag even as the buoyancy of the trapped air would have fought against the water pressure to reach the surface before it totally escaped the hull and other compartments with the structural breakup. Even at a slant angle the amount of water depth the bow would have passed through before bottoming out would have likely been around 750 feet but that would vary on the actual dive angle. Regardless, for the ship to accelerate from let's say 12 mph (17.6 feet/second) to even 30 mph (44 feet/second) in the amount of time and distance it moved before hitting the bottom of the lake is, I believe, impossible.

In reference to the 200-foot long trench mentioned in the one post, that would seem logical given the amount of mass represented by the ship and cargo in motion at 10-12 mph. Discounting the weight of the ship itself, the approximately 25,000 gross tons of iron ore pellets moving at that speed would create a significant disturbance when being brought to a sudden stop. The force generated by that impact would have to go somewhere. Thus it is not surprising that a deep and long burrow was produced as the bow section was pushed forward and deeply into the mud as the forward momentum was brought to a stop within a relatively short distance.

The comparison between the damage inflicted to the Titanic when it hit the iceberg and the possible damage received by the Fitzgerald if it did strike a shoal is like comparing apples to oranges. For one, both ships had entirely different structural designs. Furthermore, the Titanic was fortunate in that it was damaged in calm weather and sank over several hours with water entering multiple compartments through a long line of damage. Given the same set of circumstances in heavy seas, it is almost certain that the ship would have sunk a lot sooner given the added strain on the weakened hull. That is one of the primary arguments against the Fitzgerald shoaling theory in that the ship would have likely foundered within a shorter time period after being damaged than it did. I believe this was addressed in at least one of the government's investigations.

Over the years, the storm that claimed the Fitzgerald has seemed to grow to mythical proportions. But how rare of a storm was it in actuality? Obviously, several ships went to anchor in Whitefish Bay and at Thunder Bay, Ontario, to wait out the storm but did any other ships, including the Arthur M. Anderson, that traversed Lake Superior during the storm have any difficulties or damage considered out of the ordinary? The only such report I recall in relation to the Anderson was some minor topside damage to one of its lifeboat davits. I once attended a presentation at Port Huron, Michigan, during the mid-1990s at which Captain Erickson of the Willam Clay Ford made himself available for questions from the attendees. One person did ask what he thought of the storm and he replied that to him it seemed no different than any other fall storms encountered 1-2 times a year. Now, this may be because when he ventured out into the lake the storm was subsiding, and as such the William Clay Ford may not have been exposed to its full ferocity. Are there any observations by anyone aboard other ships on Lake Superior at that time that can attest to the severity of the storm?

Everyone seems to be looking for a single cause for this accident. But what if it was a sequence of events, any of which the Fitzgerald could have survived, that when added together doomed the ore carrier?

Every time this debate comes up we all get into a circle debate on what happened that night. I stand by "Guest's" comment below on what went down. Until someone explains to me the caved in hatch cover, I will continuously discount the shoaling theory. Fact of the matter remains that Cooper was several miles away and gauging his insights on a dated (for that time also) radar unit.

Secondly a CG cutter could have been right next to the Fitz and the outcome would be the exact same. Look at the Clevco in Lake Erie.

Third, knocking the NTSB/USCG is also nonsensical. Technology in 1975/76 allowed for what sort of scientific research to be carried out on the hull? The panel may not have had experts originating from the lakes, but knocking their experience on the sinkings in the oceans is foolish.

To add, there is no way that the Fitz hit the bottom in excess of 20mph. There isn't enough speed or force to allow that sort of acceleration. I think someone popped that in there after watching the Titanic documentary about the sinking not thinking that Titanic had 12,000 ft of water to gain speed while the Fitz only had 500ft of water.

Tom Farnquist is the expert opinion I trust as he has been to the site more than anyone. He disagrees with the shoaling theory also. And has hours of bottom time to prove it. He does not agree with the NTSP/ USCG report conclusions, but think they are in the ballpark for actual cause.

Everything that Brian says is true! It’s also been mentioned by others and experts on the Fitzgerald sinking, that from the time of the last call from the Anderson at 7:10 p.m. some estimate that it took less than about 5 minutes or so that she would’ve dove for the bottom of the lake at that point. Others have also tried to estimate and calculate just how fast she would’ve been going once she hit the bottom? Some say she would’ve been going as fast as 30-40 m.p.h. possibly when she then hit bottom? Of course due to gravity in my videos about it, all that cargo as Brian said is sliding and shifting forward further driving the nose down to the bottom. Basically folks, some say the way the Fitz dove toward the bottom was like a submarine if you can imagine that! After either the 1994 or 1995 dive by the team of divers from the GLSHS from Whitefish if you will, they determined that once Fitzgerald hit bottom it drove a trench about 200 feet long before finally settling to the bottom. They say the bow is buried in the mud 24 feet on one side I thought I had heard and like 26 or 27 maybe on the other side? Still very sad!

Her stern broke away because the hull was damaged from the shoal & when those rogue waves drove her bow down, her bow slammed into the bottom while the engine was still pushing ahead. The weakened center section broke apart from the impact of the bow hitting bottom, the ore shifting ahead & out, & the stern shoving into it. The torque from the rotating propeller shaft & prop caused the stern to rotate over upside down as the stern broke away, shifted to one side & dove for the bottom. All this happened super fast & she went down so quick that the boat dove under in an instant, broke apart in seconds, & impacted the bottom in 3 different sections before you could even comprehend what was happening.